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‘Against Agonistic Liberalism: Milbank and Pabst’s Relentless Pursuit of 
Radical Anglican Thomism’ 
 
(review of John Milbank and Adrian Pabst, The Politics of Virtue: Post-
Liberalism and the Human Future, Future Perfect series (London: Rowman & 
Littlefield International, 2016). x + 407 pp. £24.95. ISBN 978-1-7834-8649-6 
(pbk) 
 
Reviewed by Robert Song, Durham University, UK 
robert.song@durham.ac.uk 
 
 There is no doubt that within the world of Christian social thought the 
appearance of this book by John Milbank and Adrian Pabst has been something 
of a marvel. Like some great mythical beast, it has arrived on the battlefield 
bristling with ideas, trampling underfoot or imperiously putting to the sword 
all those who venture opposition, striving to reverse the tide through the sheer 
weight of its presence. Milbank’s extensive earlier work in the area dates back 
to his enormously influential Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular 
Reason (Blackwell, 1990), while Pabst is the author of the highly impressive 
Metaphysics: The Creation of Hierarchy (Eerdmans, 2012) and co-editor of Blue 
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Labour: Forging a New Politics (I.B.Tauris, 2015), a collection of essays which 
works out in the British context some of the practice for which The Politics of 
Virtue is the theory. 
 
 The central argument revolves round an account of the liberal tradition, 
which the authors take to have a unified ontological core and to be the 
dominant ideology of the modern period. Although the social and cultural 
rights-liberalism of the left and the economic market-liberalism of the right 
occupy opposing ends of the conventional political spectrum, they exist in a 
‘secret collusive harmony’ (13), in that each of them is simultaneously 
atomising and authoritarian. The development of liberalism is traced back to 
certain later mediaeval and early modern accounts of nature and grace that 
became influential in the Reformation period: by contrast with patristic and 
Thomistic accounts that were happy to assert a concursus between divine and 
human action, these more voluntarist and univocalist accounts set them in 
competition, rendering the human realm amorally devoid of grace. The 
culmination of this is found in the Hobbesian ontology of violence, in which the 
natural war of all against all is countered by the invention of a collective 
Leviathan to whom sovereign power is granted in exchange for protection. 
(Locke is drafted in alongside Hobbes – with no evident concession to the 
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Cambridge School’s view of him as a relatively traditional natural law thinker 
who regarded Hobbes as an intellectual nightmare.) 
 
This represents the heart of liberalism’s ontology. It underlies, on the 
one side, the development of capitalism, mediated through the eighteenth 
century argument that private vice is miraculously transformed into public 
benefit through the providential operations of the invisible hand. The self-
interested, utility-maximising behaviour of homo economicus is natural solely 
in Hobbesian terms, yet when taken with claims about the ‘natural’ scarcity of 
goods and the ontology of violence, it constitutes a ‘triple anthropological 
pessimism’ (48) that undergirds the allegedly natural workings of unfettered 
market liberalism. 
 
 Left-leaning liberalism, on the other side, is indebted to Rousseau’s 
romantic individualism in thinking of the individual as naturally good and 
society as the source of envy and rivalry. Yet the contrast with Hobbesian 
liberalism is superficial, for the mistrust in shared traditions and the 
institutions that embody them leads left-liberalism to seek for people’s 
‘chaotically various individual desires’ (27) to be emancipated from social 
norms that are perceived to be merely conventional and arbitrary, and to call 
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on the state’s assistance in doing so. The upshot has been a steady 
undermining of the personal and intermediate forms of association that 
compose the thick texture of human life, leaving individuals progressively more 
exposed to direct state power. Increasingly unable to draw on these 
associational resources, individuals have to engage with each other through 
the distancing and impersonal mechanisms of the market, which reinforces the 
power of those who benefit from market transactions – both the state as self-
interested regulator but also those with the economic capacity to bend the 
market to their advantage. 
 
 The ‘liberal right as the party of greed and the liberal left as the party of 
lust’ (27, one of their numerous bon mots) harbour more in common than 
either might care to admit, both ontologically and at the level of political and 
economic outcome. The assumption of the underlying violence of human 
relationship, the clash of wills which can only be resolved by market 
competition or state fiat, the replacement of mutual relations of trust by 
contracts with strangers or by subjection to bureaucratic classification – all 
point to a metacrisis of liberalism. Thus is disclosed the metaphysical nihilism 
of the age, which simultaneously abstracts and materializes, abstracting from 
reality by representing persons as brute individuals, shorn of their embedded 
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social identities, while rendering reality the more purely material by denying 
that goodness is intrinsic to nature. Deprived of their ontological coherence, 
human beings disintegrate, pulled apart in two ostensibly opposed directions: 
on the one hand, the subhuman reduction to natural evolutionary contingency 
and, on the other, the transhuman transcendence of that same contingency.  
 
 Milbank and Pabst’s response to this lies in a recovery of several crucial 
ideas: first, of the ancient and Christian understanding of human beings as 
animals who do not transcend but fulfil their animal nature in the fashioning of 
political societies; second, of the Christian idea of the person, one who is not a 
merely repeatable and substitutable members of a species, but is absolutely 
unique whilst also intrinsically constituted in relation to others through shared 
participation in a transcendent Logos; third, of the idea of the good not as a 
willed imposition on an otherwise indifferent universe, but as integrally related 
to the natural flourishing of all things. Socially and politically this works out in 
terms of an emphasis on habits and institutions that reflect and enable the 
communal nature of human beings, expressed through the principles of gift-
exchange and reciprocal ‘non-compulsory compulsion’ (71) that animate 
human society. However theirs is an advance on standard communitarianism, 
which they fault for lacking a serious engagement with structural political-
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constitutional issues and failing to realize that markets themselves are not 
simply amoral but necessarily have a telos.  
 
 Their account of the metacrisis of liberalism is followed by an exposition 
of the analogous metacrisis of capitalism. This is not fundamentally an issue of 
the recurrent cyclical crises that plague capitalism, but of its proclivities both 
towards abstraction from the real, productive economy, and towards 
materialisation and quantification of the non-material and non-quantifiable. 
These tendencies comprise the logic of the capitalist perversion of the market 
economy, not of the market economy as such: for capitalism depends on 
financial speculation and material aggregation, and is not just a means of 
production and exchange. In fact, because capitalism is indifferent to meaning 
and real difference and is therefore a solvent of them (its processes render 
equivalent a silk blouse and a poison gas, as Carl Schmitt put it), it is a means of 
destruction before it is a system of production. However their proposed 
alternative is not the conventional social democratic tax-and-spend response 
to neo-liberalism. That nostrum of the centre-left doesn’t address the 
intrinsically amoral nature of capitalism, but rides the tiger in an effort to tame 
it; it fails to see that Keynesian regulation is in truth no more than a necessary 
self-correcting moment within capitalism’s own inherent dynamics; and it only 
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provides enough redistribution to palliate, but not enough to prevent the 
growth of a new class of the hyper-wealthy. Rather, Milbank and Pabst’s 
preference is for the civil economy model initially elaborated by Adam Smith’s 
Italian contemporary Antonio Genovesi and currently advocated by Luigino 
Bruni and Stefano Zamagni. For Genovesi, the butcher, the brewer or the baker 
do not have to set benevolence in opposition to their own interest: unlike for 
Smith, people’s natural sympathies extend to the economic contracts they 
enter into, and they cannot be happy if other people are unhappy (‘no human 
being not even the most cruel and hardened can enjoy pleasures in which no 
one else participates’ (quoted, 138)). There can be a genuinely shared interest, 
which dissolves some of the familiar dichotomies of capitalism: self-interest vs 
altruism, gift vs contract, visible hand vs invisible hand. From this basis they 
develop large numbers of themes, in which reasonable profit and mutual 
benefit are not construed as antithetical, competition and cooperation are 
held in productive tension, firms are driven by social and environmental as well 
as financial goals, priority is given to investment in the real economy, workers 
are rewarded with just wages and consumers with just prices, economic 
regeneration is linked with cultural renewal and civic pride, local and regional 
banks are supported, welfare is mutualised, vocational training strengthened, 
ownership of capital much more widely distributed.  
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A review can do scant justice to the wealth of ideas to be found here. 
Subsequent parts of the book rehearse other metacrises and propose 
alternatives. The metacrisis of democracy is met by the mixed constitution 
alternative; the metacrisis of culture is contrasted with an account of culture as 
formation; and finally, the metacrisis of the nations is countered by their 
proposals for a new international order. While at least some of the ideas 
throughout the book will be familiar to students of Catholic and more broadly 
Christian social thought, in truth the breadth of their treatment and the sheer 
brazen confidence with which they treat ideas ranging from the metaphysics of 
mediaeval nominalism to proposals for a revised (British-led!) European Union 
as a model for the global future, traversing all historical and disciplinary stops 
in between, mark this out from the vast majority of writings in Christian social 
ethics. Everyone familiar with the book will have their own anthology of 
memorable pronouncements they find either brilliant or exasperating. For this 
reader one unexpected pleasure was their counter-suggestible rehabilitation 
of the idea of aristocracy, on which they have pleasingly complex views. 
Drawing out some of the logic of representation, which is practically and 
theoretically inescapable in a democracy of any size or complexity, aristocracy 
names the necessity of a constitutional role for a limited number of 
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representatives; and it is better for the body politic if these are role models 
(i.e. ‘virtuous’) rather than self-serving careerists. But representation (here the 
Christological logic is plain) also implies embodying those one represents, and 
since human beings have geographically and socially formed identities, so 
aristocracy is also about both the representation of localities, regions and 
minorities upwards to national and supra-national government, and the 
recognition of the reality of those lower identities through devolutionary 
federalism. Above all aristocracy elevates the rule of virtue, of those who are 
‘skilled, generous and wise at every level of society from the plumber to the 
wing-commander’ (7), not (of course) about the legitimation of corrupt elites. 
And paradoxically this could be a profoundly democratising insight, for 
everyone whatever their background shares in wisdom about something. 
 
 However there are themes to which they pay lip service but which they 
could easily have developed more hospitably. As a way into this, consider first 
what they mean by a ‘metacrisis’. A metacrisis is not an ordinary crisis, a 
cyclical or short-term or externally-caused event of the kind that all systems 
face from time to time. Nor, importantly, is it a final crisis, the result of a series 
of contingent circumstances which bring a particular social or economic order 
to an end; for in the future that system or something like it could always be 
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resuscitated. No, a metacrisis is fundamentally the crisis of an idea, the laying 
bare of internal contradictions that were always present. This underlies their 
analysis of liberalism, for the problem with liberalism is metaphysical before it 
is ever political or economic or cultural. The spirit of the age is the target of 
their diagnosis, and it is their confidence in their identification of this 
animating principle which enables them to brush aside all alternative readings 
of liberalism: that it should be understood in terms of overlapping family 
resemblances; or that we should talk with John Gray of liberalisms in the 
plural; or that ideas which have conventionally been attributed to liberalism 
should rather be credited to classical republicanism, as J. G. A. Pocock 
influentially urged now over forty years ago. All forms of liberalism in the end 
revert to their Hobbesian type, degenerating into the oscillation between 
atomism and collectivism. The possible exceptions to this are the more 
organicist late-nineteenth-century liberalisms of T. H. Green or L. T. Hobhouse, 
but these are briskly declared to be not ‘exclusively or even predominantly 
liberal’ (34). 
 
 So far, so Hegelian, one is tempted to say. But their version of a 
metacrisis doesn’t give rise to its dialectical successor, at least not in any 
mechanical or historically necessary way. No future is announced that was not 
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present before. No resolution emerges that consigns the past to the past. On 
the contrary, it turns out that the post-liberal is the pre-liberal in all but name, 
and, despite occasional protestations, their rendering of it in practice is 
marked by an extreme reluctance to concede that there is anything of 
significance to be learned from the encounter with liberalism which might 
render post-liberalism ‘post-’ in anything other than a chronological sense: 
what after all could be learned from nihilism? Their idealism is in truth more 
Platonist than Hegelian: their hope is rooted not in any historical teleology, but 
in recovery of the abiding truths that are the shared patrimony of pre-modern 
wisdom, that goodness runs with the grain of the universe, and therefore that 
in the long run virtue pays off, there being no final conflict between nobility 
and practical realism. In fact for them if a future is announced it lies in the 
past: if for Hegel the end of history was to be located in the nineteenth 
century, in the sense that the truth about social order was then finally known, 
all subsequent events merely bringing the facts into line with the idea, for 
Milbank and Pabst the end of history is to be found in the thirteenth century, 
or to be precise, in the thirteenth century as articulated in the Anglican polity 
of the sixteenth century, all else being footnotes.  
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This does not make theirs an exercise in nostalgia, as they rightly plead, 
or at least it need not. For what they are articulating are permanent 
possibilities for thought and, appropriately contextualised, for action, and the 
potential for instantiating these lies in principle in the future as much as ever in 
the past. Nevertheless their determination to look to the future with so much 
evident enthusiasm for the past, particularly when taken with their penchant 
for anti-modern contrarianism (anaesthetics are over-rated, I think I remember 
reading), does give their work an unnecessarily fogeyish cast. Apart from 
making it likely to lose them a large part of the audience that they richly 
deserve and that badly needs to learn from what they have to teach, it is also 
in danger of missing an important feature of how we learn from history. 
 
 Do we have to read the last four centuries exactly as they do? We should 
be clear that their totalising impulse, reading the age in terms of its governing 
idea, is the source of many of their most brilliant insights. But it all feels a bit 
relentless at times. Does it mean that there is nothing to be learned from the 
period in which liberalism has been dominant? If we are to affirm with 
Augustine the equidistance in relation to God of every period of history after 
Christ, might we not also wish to affirm that in the divine patience there may 
be unexpected beauty in every epoch, and that every age and every culture 
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may in principle be alert to facets of the good that are not so evident or 
accessible to others? Eras are inherently more complex, and the relation 
between their characteristic sins and their characteristic forms of good less 
easy to disentangle, than one might sometimes suppose from Milbank and 
Pabst’s work. Their frequent disavowals and exceptionalising bear inadvertent 
witness to this: to take just one example, after attributing the quality and style 
of Italian cars, food, fashion and design to Italy’s Renaissance heritage, by 
contrast with their mediocre American and therefore quintessentially modern 
equivalents, they then explain the evident excellence of some American 
products by resort to the claim that ‘certain aspects of the Middle Ages and 
Renaissance survive in the United States as well’ (145)! 
 
 Somehow we need to find a way of engaging positively and generously 
with the modern world in a way that doesn’t deny the ontological violence 
which Milbank and Pabst have so acutely discerned at the heart of modernity, 
but that does allow us to move forward in a way that is substantially and not 
just chronologically post-liberal. To give one example, it would take really quite 
a small shift of emphasis to handle identity politics rather differently than they 
do. There is no doubt that the politics of gender, race, sexuality and so on have 
at times been marred by the agonistic features of the epoch in which they have 
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been born, but equally there is no doubt that addressing the dynamics of 
power and social recognition from the standpoint of those who experience 
exclusion is a gain, one which is widely identified with that same ‘liberal’ 
historical period. They do acknowledge something in the area in general terms, 
referring for example to ‘oppressive and unjustifiable prejudices against 
women and minorities and intolerances of exceptions and complications’ (88; 
cf. 55), but comments such as these wear an air of concession, and don’t 
convincingly bring out the moral insight that recognition of the experience of 
exclusion surely represents. This has several unfortunate consequences. First, 
it increases the danger of their being co-opted by one side in the culture wars, 
ironically reinforcing a stand-off that it has been one of the major triumphs of 
the book to transcend. Second, it means that they fail to address adequately 
one of the most obvious and endemic dangers of the kind of associationism 
they urge on us, namely that communities find their identity in part by shared 
agreements about who to exclude. Third, it reduces the likelihood that there 
will be thoughtful engagement with their own insightful criticisms of formalist 
egalitarianism, and their intriguing if enigmatic (and perhaps alarming?) 
proposals for the ‘inequality though equal social importance’ of different social 
roles (14). And finally, it does not help us to advance towards the reciprocal 
recognition as equals that would distinguish a properly post-liberal organicism 
 15 
from its feudal and pre-liberal predecessors that did not wrestle in the same 
way with these questions. 
 
 There are other parallel concerns which might be explored, for example 
with regard to the dangers of moral, social and political authoritarianism to 
which the liberal tradition was so sensitive in its own telling of its story, and 
which Milbank and Pabst themselves would share. In terms of a constructive 
vision, both this and the emphasis on mutual recognition as equals would be 
amongst the factors that could pave the way for an authentically post-liberal 
socialism – such as Milbank and Pabst themselves favour – one that draws 
inspiration from but extends the British tradition of ethical socialism 
represented by, variously, Edmund Burke, William Cobbett, Robert Owen, John 
Ruskin, William Morris, R. H. Tawney, and Dorothy L. Sayers. Such a vision 
would root social relations in trust and mutual concern rather than in 
impersonal contract, and would not confuse the common good with the 
accumulation of material wealth. It would, further, be open to the possibility 
that the most intellectually satisfying accounts of equality, freedom and 
representation are rooted within and not without the mainstream Christian 
theological tradition, and would find in the affirmation of a good that precedes 
 16 
all our desirings the unexpected basis for a tolerant and genuinely pluralist 
society. 
 
Working towards that is of course another matter. As they observe, one 
important part consists in re-imagining what we are already doing, 
appreciating that our habits are sometimes better than our theories, 
recognizing that we may already be less liberal and less capitalist than we think 
we are. But uprooting a society’s metaphysics is not just a matter of 
reinterpretation. It also involves changing its practices, so that over time the 
assumptions of Hobbesian liberalism become simply unimaginable because 
they no longer correspond in any intelligible way to social experience. The 
practices and institutions that The Politics of Virtue proposes, and the means of 
achieving them, may not be dependent on the same putatively scientific 
understanding of history that bewitched earlier critics of liberal capitalism. But 
Milbank and Pabst’s intent in joining the fray is undoubtedly as radical. 
 
